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Abstract. Spoken-of motion is usually conceptualised as a change of
existential states (an entity moves from A to B in order to change its
potentiality for further action), while perceived motion is usually only
conceptualised as a change of position. As a means of technically track-
ing motions, we can think of processing-networks tied to both, sensors
and read-out devices, that use a process orientated internal evaluation
of incoming data. Properly chosen, they eliminate the difference between
detecting a shift of state and detecting a shift of position. A proposal
for the layout and use of processing elements in such a network is pre-
sented — as an early general construction idea with an invitation to ask
questions about its usability.
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Motion as tracked in language is usually a shift of states, while motion as tracked
in perception is usually a shift of position. Jill can be seen to follow a certain
trajectory when crossing the hallway, but she is described as leaving the kitchen
and walking over to the dining hall. We cannot, in a purely perceptional perspec-
tive, “see” her moving out of the kitchen and into the dining hall. Such concepts
as “kitchen” and “walking over” which are needed for the cognitively enriched
form of seeing are therefore, in our current machine implementations, treated as
additional to perceptional motion tracking. They might for example be taken as
derivative, in the sense that they can be looked up in a knowledge base that holds
information about regions for the kitchen, given in spatial coordinates, regions
for the dining hall, and some reachability information that indicates whether
there is access from one area to the other. In such an implementation, a com-
puter, after seeing the trajectory, can find out whether a labelling of getting from
A to B (“kitchen” to “dining hall”) is appropriate or not. It can proceed from
seeing to seeing-as (or “interpreted seeing”). In a certain sense we can conceive
of those motions that we have linguistic labels for, as purposeful instantiations
of motion patterns.
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We shall, in this paper, not discuss motions as static instantiations of intentions.
Certainly we often linguistically refer to ongoing change of position as exhibiting
constant instantiation of a motion pattern (“Betty is dancing in the hall,”“The
robot is moving towards the door”). Yet an entity starting or ending such a
motion goes through a shift of its existential state, and it is this aspect that is
in the focus of our distinction between interpreted and uninterpreted motion.
When we uninterpretedly “see” a motion, we can (as a reaction to a change in
sensor signals) implicitly know that a state shift took place but we do not “see”
what kind of shift this was, unless we add interpretation.
If we intend to computationally enact such interpretation, we might be tempted
to find a common format of representation for our sensor data that allows for
elements of bundling (bundling of occupied regions in space) and indication of
transition (transition in space, and in state space). The conceptualisation of
a representation format, in this context, is a traditional candidate, but a rep-
resentation might not be fully appropriate. Because it is always representation-
process-pairs that establish a grounded processing of environmental information,
we might seek for a rather dynamic and process-bound way of tying a machine’s
states to its environment’s state, that entails both, detection and interpretation
of the environment’s state.
We might base our approach on some speculative insights. I propose that in our
implementation work we try to fulfil some of the ontological criteria that we find
both, in the cosmological concepts of the late Whitehead [1], and in the (un-
written) semiotic ontology of Peirce (cf. [2, 3]).1 According to Whitehead, the
basic elements which this world is made of are “actual entities” (sometimes also
called “actual events”). They pick up information from a relevant environment
(a process which is determined by what data is available), then individually and
freely process them to some internal emphasis, and then, at the end of their
life-cycle, hand it over to successors while they disappear. Data transition (ex-
ternal process) is determined, while data evaluation (internal process) is free.
For Peirce, a potential infinity in data transition that conserves some qualities
of the original events is constitutive for a semiosis. This conservative element
allows for freedom in the transition process. The aspired-at infinity of the sign
process is real just as a mathematical limes is real. Despite never being reached,
it is real by being aspired at.
I suggest that we equip our machine with a high number of perceptual units that
serve the roˆle of data collectors, with internal processing possibilities that aim
at increasing some aspects of the incoming data while decreasing or eliminating
other aspects of them. After processing, they distribute their results to succes-
sors. (This marks an end of a life-cycle.) They can then technically be reused
in further such events of streaming data through the system, at a later point in
processing time. Some of the perceptual units are connected to input sensors,
most of them are connected to each other, and some of them are connected to
1 Ontology is used here in the traditional sense, as related to what constitutes being
as opposed to not being.
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output devices. The difference to neural network implementations is that we do
not so much care about transition weights for activations from one cell to an-
other, but that we allow some internal processing that changes incoming data.
Instead of spreading activation patterns, we spread (processed) data.
We apply judgement algorithms that operate within the linked cells. They
strengthen or weaken (or eliminate) input information, and do some of the tran-
sition calculations towards the output. We can think of having a hierarchical
structure that would entail that those processing units at the beginnings of the
chains have other input categories than those towards the ends of the chains,
so that they can be used for data intake into the network. Alternatively we can
think of having unique entities and a transition layer at the input side of the
network. In either case, output qualities of the network are made up by combi-
natorial use of cells’ data, so that output is actually emergent to the grouping
of individual output data (so that always some cells form nexus and constitute
a processing aim).
To make a proposal of how our network could be sketched, here’s a diagram:
network of processing "cells"
(aims at modification of labels and
 modification of box contents)
"knowledge
situation"
(can be 
read out
any time)
environmental
signals
transduction −−> "labeled signals," signals in "labeled boxes"
I invite the reader to discuss whether this kind of “machinery in the machine”
sounds appealing. Among the questions that need to be answered, and should be
discussed, is: “What kind of action patterns (or motion patterns) of a machine
that internally makes use of such a nexus of cells can we conceive of?” and
“What type of motion classification and action planning capacities can we see as
emergent of this potential behaviour?”.
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In order to try to motivate the approach of chain-processing for sensor signals,
I’d like to add one more thought: Our language conceptualises certain move-
ment patterns as possible, others as not (an elephant cannot fly, while a bird
can). That does not necessarily imply, though, that all our linguistically coded
knowledge of moving objects is depending on a word-net–like tagging mecha-
nism for assignment of possible-actions to objects. But we can conceive of it to
be so, nevertheless, at least if we plan to adopt our capacities in machines. A
moving object is an entity tagged with possibilities and non-possibilities, indi-
cating prominently what can be known about possible change and non-change
in movement, among other things. In order to test for an appropriate labelling,
laws of motion mechanics could be applied.
The idea now is that instead of implementing all knowledge about possible change
and non-change of state in some explicit mechanism with a “labelling capacity,”
we put initial data acquisition for motion signals on the sensors, spread this data
in the network and use the network’s response for ascriptions of classificatory
quasi-labels: habit-like reactions to input patterns. So we count on adaptation
to input to develop in the processing chain — a “knowledge” or “feeling” for
what patterns input-signals have. It is an idea of conserving and strengthening
inherent information in data by streaming them through evaluation processes of
enforcement or selection or omission.
The evaluation processes are internal to the processing cells. Because they pro-
vide the dynamics of the system, they must of course be chosen rich enough to
do some useful work — if we want the processing system to exhibit something
like “intentions” towards certain processing results, this has to emerge out of our
implementations of cell level evaluation processes. Intentionality might ideally
be inherent to the evaluation processes, although it is not explicitly coded at
implementation time.
I’m very interested to discuss with the reader the potentials that we can find in
this general idea, and to intensify speculations aimed at cell implementations of
appropriate processes for motion classification.
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